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A $1 BILLION PARABLE 
BERNARD CHAO
†
 AND JONATHAN R. GRAY
*
 
In August 2012, the jury awarded Monsanto a whopping one billion 
dollars in its patent infringement lawsuit against DuPont. That’s real 
money even for today’s high stakes patent disputes. Although many ob-
servers were shocked by the sheer magnitude of the award, it’s really the 
damages theory that should provoke concern. Unlike most patent law-
suits, which are based on selling infringing products, Monsanto recov-
ered damages even though the defendant, DuPont, hadn’t sold any of its 
infringing genetically modified soybean seeds. Let’s be perfectly clear: 
DuPont had made no money for any sales of infringing seeds and Mon-
santo had lost no sales of its seeds because of DuPont’s infringement. 
Nevertheless, the jury awarded one billion dollars in damages to Mon-
santo.  
But even though the parties have now settled their dispute,
1
 such an 
astonishing result deserves a deeper look. When this award is examined 
more closely, it’s clear that it is far too high. Although Monsanto's dam-
ages theory appears to be a straightforward application of the way patent 
awards reasonably royalties, Monsanto did not suffer a one billion dollar 
injury. The award was the result of an uncritical application of the black 
letter law. This case illustrates how even courts, and in the largest and 
most complex cases, may fail to see the forest for trees. Hopefully, law-
yers can learn from this case and avoid committing the same mistakes in 
the future. 
I. MONSANTO’S GENETICALLY MODIFIED SEEDS 
Years ago, Monsanto had developed and patented genetically modi-
fied soybeans that were resistant to Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide. Con-
sequently, when farmers used Roundup to kill undesirable weeds, the 
soybean plants would remain unaffected. Monsanto’s seed was so suc-
cessful that by 2011, nine out of ten soybean farmers were using Mon-
santo’s seeds.
2
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 1. Andrew Pollack, Monsanto and DuPont Settle Fight Over Patent Licensing, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 27, 2013, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/business/monsanto-and-
dupont-settle-fight-over-roundup-ready-technology.html?_r=0. 
 2. Monsanto Strong-Arms Seed Industry, CBSNEWS.COM (Jan. 4, 2011, 10:00AM), 
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DuPont was interested in entering the market and it eventually ob-
tained a license to Monsanto’s technology. Consequently, DuPont began 
to develop its own competing Roundup resistant soybeans. However, 
DuPont didn’t just want to sell the same seeds as Monsanto, it wanted to 
sell an improved version. So DuPont tried to mix Roundup resistant traits 
with other desirable traits. The result was Optimum GAT (“OGAT”) 
soybeans. Before DuPont brought its OGAT seeds to market, Monsanto 
sued arguing that DuPont did not have a license to stack additional traits 
on top of Monsanto’s roundup resistant soybean seeds. If Monsanto’s 
interpretation of the license was correct, DuPont’s OGAT soybean seeds 
were unlicensed and infringed the RE 39,247 patent.
3
 That is precisely 
what Monsanto alleged when it sued DuPont on May 4, 2009.
4
  
Unlike most patent lawsuits that are based on selling infringing 
products, DuPont never sold its OGAT seeds. Here, the accusation of 
infringement is based on seeds that DuPont developed but had not yet 
sold, and the award is based on the royalties that DuPont would have 
paid had it negotiated a license ahead of time. 
II. THE STRAIGHT FORWARD CASE FOR $ 1 BILLION 
The district court did not apply the wrong law. Quite the contrary, 
the court relied on an existing rule and literally applied it to the unusual 
facts of Monsanto’s dispute with DuPont. The problem is that the court 
failed to consider the bigger picture—to see if the law made sense in this 
particular context. When the verdict is viewed from this perspective, it is 
clear that the jury’s award is far too high. To demonstrate why this is 
true, we must look at the theory underlying Monsanto’s damages award.  
There are two primary forms of money damages in patent law: lost 
profits and a reasonable royalty. Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, the statute gov-
erning patent damages, a prevailing patentee can receive lost profits.
5
 But 
if the patentee does not have any lost profits or is unable to prove them, a 
reasonable royalty is always available.
6
 In this case, DuPont’s genetically 
modified soybean seeds had not yet made it to market. So Monsanto had 
not lost any sales, and the only available remedy was a reasonable royal-
ty.    
The primary method for determining a reasonable royalty is the so-
called hypothetical negotiation.
7
 Jurors are instructed to consider a hypo-
  
 3. The term “RE” indicates that Monsanto’s patent was reissued. When certain conditions 
are met, 35 U.S.C. § 251 allows a patentee to make limited changes to the patent’s claims. The 
claims delimit the patent’s property right. 
 4. Docket Report, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours and Co., Civ. #: 4:09-CV-
00686-ERW (E.D. Mo. July 31, 2012). 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 6. Id. 
 7. In the past, courts have also used the analytical method, which focuses on the infringer's 
projections of profit for the infringing product. Under this method, the infringer’s projected profits 
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thetical negotiation and ascertain the royalty upon which the parties 
would have agreed had they successfully negotiated a license.
8
 This is 
the theory that Monsanto proceeded upon in its case against DuPont.
9
 
Patent law imposes two important sets of conditions on the hypo-
thetical negotiation. First, the hypothetical negotiation assumes that the 
patent at issue is valid and infringed.
10
 Of course, this is different from 
what would happen during any actual negotiations where some discount 
would be applied for the possibility that the patent is not infringed or 
invalid. But unlike a real world negotiation, reasonable royalties are only 
awarded after the defendant has been found to infringe a valid patent.
11
 
Second, and more importantly for this case, the hypothetical negotiation 
takes place at the time of first infringement.
12
 This prevents a successful 
patentee from enjoying the unexpected success of an infringer or suffer-
ing from its unexpected disappointments.
13
 Rather, the patentee is sup-
posed to be awarded precisely what it would have received had the par-
ties agreed to a license.
14
 It is this rule that lies at the heart of Monsanto’s 
one billion dollar award. 
The jury instructions said “[a] reasonable royalty is the amount . . . 
that a patent holder and the infringer would have agreed to in a hypothet-
ical negotiation taking place at a time prior to when the infringement first 
began.”
15
 But the time of first infringement occurred before DuPont sold 
any product.
16
 Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), making an infringing product 
constitutes patent infringement.
17
 Thus, DuPont first infringed Monsan-
to’s patent when it made the very first OGAT seed, and it is at this time 
  
are apportioned between the patent owner and the infringer. See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 
F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Although not explicitly rejected, this approach is almost never used 
today. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that the 
“more common approach” is the hypothetical negotiation). 
 8. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 9. See Jury Instruction No. 31, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours and Co., No. 4:09-
CV-00686-ERW (E.D. Mo. July 31, 2012) (No. 1566). 
 10. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325. 
 11. See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHT AND REMEDIES, 229–30 (2005) (explaining why the hypothetical 
negotiation needs to make these counterfactual assumptions to avoid under compensation). 
 12. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 76 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 13. See Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“Whether, as events unfurled thereafter, [the infringer] would have made an actual profit, while 
paying the royalty determined as of [the date infringement began], is irrelevant.”) (citing Panduit 
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1164 (6th Cir. 1978)). 
 14. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325. 
 15. See supra note 9. 
 16. DuPont elected not to commercialize the product, and Monsanto feared that this was 
purely a litigation tactic to influence the jury's award of damages. Transcript of Record, Vol. XV-A 
at 6, 10, 107, 132, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours and Co., No. 4:09-CV-00686-ERW 
(E.D. Mo. July 31, 2012) (No. 1574). Monsanto successfully argued that the intent to commercialize 
should not affect the damages calculation. See Transcript of Record, Vol. XVIII at 148, Monsanto 
Co. v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours and Co., No 4:09-CV-00686-ERW (E.D. Mo. July 31, 2012) (No. 
1581). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010). 
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that the hypothetical negotiation takes place.
18
 There was some evidence 
in the trial record to suggest that DuPont had previously taken fully paid-
up licenses.
19
 In other words, DuPont might have preferred to pay a sin-
gle upfront fee instead of a running, per unit royalty. There was also evi-
dence suggesting that DuPont’s' profits would be so large that paying one 
billion dollars for a license to Monsanto’s patent made sense.
20
 Moreo-
ver, the jury was explicitly told to ignore events that occurred after the 
time of first infringement.
21
 Thus, the jury was not supposed to consider 
the fact that DuPont had later decided to abandon its attempt to sell 
OGAT seeds.
22
 Given these instructions, the award becomes less shock-
ing, perhaps even expected. 
In sum, the court’s jury instructions are based on black letter law. 
Moreover, the jury appeared to faithfully apply these instructions to the 
evidence. So what could be wrong? Given that DuPont did not sell any 
infringing seeds, one billion dollars certainly feels too large. But lawyers 
are supposed to follow the law, not their feelings, right? Not always: 
When a result feels wrong, it is usually time to probe deeper.  
III. THINKING DEEPER: THE CASE AGAINST $1 BILLION 
The problem with the Monsanto award is that using the time of first 
infringement to calculate such a large lump-sum royalty does not reflect 
what happens in the real world. Standing alone, using the time of first 
infringement or awarding a lump-sum royalty can accurately model a 
real negotiation. But together these concepts make for an untrustworthy 
combination.  
The time of first infringement works for most cases because juries 
typically calculate reasonable royalties based on the number of infringing 
  
 18. Monsanto and DuPont argued over whether there were two separate infringements for 
purposes of calculating damages. Transcript of Record, Vol. XVIII, supra note 16, at 44–47. Mon-
santo argued that infringement occurred in 2006, and then again in 2008. Id. at 44–45. DuPont 
argued that the law is clear, only providing for a damage calculation to be done from "a time prior to 
the date of first infringement." Id. at 46–47. 
 19. There was some evidence suggesting that DuPont had paid smaller lump-sum royalties for 
unproven technology in the past. Transcript of Record, Vol. XV-B at 27–28, 95–96, Monsanto Co. v. 
E.I. Dupont DeNemours and Co., No. 4:09-CV-00686-ERW (E.D. Mo. July 31, 2012) (No. 1576). 
 20. See Transcript of Record, Vol. XVIII, supra note 16, at 145–47 (revealing that internal 
projections at DuPont showed "198 million additional sales"). 
 21. See Jury Instruction No. 31, supra note 9 (“Evidence of things that happened after the 
infringement first began can be considered . . . only to the extent that the evidence aids in assessing 
what royalty would have resulted from a hypothetical negotiation.”). 
 22. Leo Sun, DuPont Loses a $1 Billion Settlement to Monsanto, INVESTORGUIDE.COM (Aug. 
3, 2012), http://www.investorguide.com/article/10842/dupont-dd-loses-a-1-billion-settlement-to-
monsanto-mon/. See also Jack Kaskey, DuPont and Monsanto Agree to End Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 26, 2013, 2:20PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-26/dupont-monsanto-agree-to-
end-lawsuits.html (“Today’s agreement won’t prompt a revival of the abandoned GAT project 
. . . .”). 
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products sold.
23
 This accurately models most real world licenses, which 
require payments based on the number of licensed units that are sold.
24
 
One benefit of this type of award is that it minimizes the possibility that 
juries will inaccurately predict the royalty base.
25
 Juries do not have to 
figure out how many infringing units the parties thought the infringer 
would have sold at the time of first infringement. The number of actual 
infringing units is used. Thus, the only value that the jury calculates is 
the royalty rate.  
Now it is also perfectly acceptable for juries to award lump-sum 
reasonable royalties. Lump-sum awards allow the infringer to continue to 
sell the infringing product because they have paid a flat sum for the un-
limited use of the plaintiff’s patent. Lump-sum awards also accurately 
model those occasional real world licenses that only involve a single 
payment. However, one problem with this type of award is that it in-
creases the possibility that jurors will rely on the wrong assumptions to 
calculate damages. They do not just have to calculate the royalty rate; 
juries need to determine the number of units the infringer was likely to 
sell. Obviously, this increases the possibility for mistake. The Monsanto 
verdict illustrates how far off the jury can be. The one billion dollars 
clearly assumed that DuPont would have sold a lot of seed. But we know 
that DuPont sold none.  
The problem is that using the time of first infringement to arrive at a 
huge lump-sum is not consistent with how real world companies behave. 
No company, even a Fortune 500 company like DuPont, would pay one 
billion dollars to license an untested product under development. That is 
particularly true for emerging technologies like genetically modified 
organisms. Indeed, that is just what one DuPont witness explained.
26
 The 
results are simply too unpredictable to risk such a large sum of money. 
Companies can only afford to pay such amounts when success is more 
certain. That is why running royalties are so popular. It reduces the risk 
of failure. It’s true that some licenses can involve both a flat fee and a 
  
 23. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]warding a reasonable royalty based on . . . number of units sold can be economically justi-
fied.”). 
 24. See Ronald G. Vollmar & Jeffrey S. Whittle, Calculating Reasonable Royalty Damages in 
the Changing World of Patent Litigation in the United States, ASPATORE, Nov. 2012, at 8, available 
at 2012 WL 6636453 (“[T]he running royalty is the form financial experts most frequently use 
. . . .”). We are comparing the lump-sum royalty model to a per unit or running royalty model. In the 
latter case, royalty amounts are based on the number of units sold. By basing royalty amounts on the 
number of units sold (quantity or a percentage of revenue) the risk is shared between the licensee 
and licensor. In a lump-sum model, the risk shifts to the licensee. 4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, 
ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 30:90 (2013). 
 25. A “royalty base” is generally calculated on a “base of sales of a particular infringing 
product.” Ravi Mohan, Analysis of the Entire Market Value Rule in Complex Technology Litigation: 
Arduous Royalty Base Determinations, Unjust Damage Rewards, and Empirical Approaches to 
Measuring Consumer Demand, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 639, 642 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Transcript of Record, Vol. XV-A, supra note 16, at 100–01. 
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running royalty payment. That is actually what Monsanto and DuPont 
eventually settled upon.
27
 Their recent settlement calls for DuPont to pay 
$1.75 billion spread over ten years with some additional payments that 
depend on the success of DuPont's product.
28
 The original $1 billion jury 
award undoubtedly had a strong influence on the size of this settlement.
29
 
However, the point is that DuPont would not voluntarily pay a huge 
lump-sum fee.   
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to fully explain how the court or 
DuPont’s attorneys could have avoided the one billion dollar verdict. A 
disturbing part of this case’s docket has been sealed, including docu-
ments related to a motion to exclude the opinions of Monsanto's damages 
expert.
30
 Consequently, we could not examine the parties' tactics or the 
court's decisions. It is hard to make concrete recommendations based on 
an incomplete record; however, we do have some of the facts. We know 
that DuPont was opposed to a large lump-sum award because it had not 
sold any infringing seeds and was no longer planning to enter the mar-
ket.
31
 Therefore, it was in DuPont’s interest for any damages award to be 
issued in the form of a per unit royalty.
32
  
We also know what the evidence at trial showed. There was some 
testimony suggesting that the value of a license to Monsanto’s Roundup 
resistant technology was one billion dollars.
33
 In addition, DuPont admit-
ted at least some insignificant licenses in the agricultural industry take 
the form of a fully paid-up license (as opposed to a running royalty).
34
 
But there does not appear to be any evidence suggesting that DuPont was 
  
 27. See Carey Gillam, Monsanto, DuPont Settle Lawsuits, Set New $1.75 Billion Deal, FOX 
BUS. (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2013/03/26/monsanto-dupont-settle-
lawsuits-set-new-175-billion-deal/. 
 28. Id.  
 29. The settlement consists of “up-front and variable based royalty payments.” Beginning in 
2014, DuPont will make four annual fixed royalty payments totaling $802 million to Monsanto. 
DuPont also agreed to pay additional royalties if it successfully sells genetically modified soybean 
seed in excess of the annual minimums. The annual minimums, which begin in 2018, total $950 
million over six years. Press Release, DuPont and Monsanto Reach Technology Licensing Agree-
ments on Next-Generation Soybean Technologies (Mar. 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.wcax.com/story/21794044/dupont-and-monsanto-reach-technology-licensing-
agreements-on-next-generation-soybean-technologies. The “variable based payments” will be de-
termined by the volume of seeds DuPont sells. Id. 
 30. See Bernard Chao, Non-Public Litigation: The Hidden Story of Monsanto v. DuPont, 
PATENTLY-O (Aug. 11 2012, 7:57 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/non-public-
litigation-the-hidden-story-of-monsanto-v-dupont.html.  
 31. See Transcript of Record, Vol. XVIII, supra note 16 at 179 (arguing "there are no sales" 
and it was "just for research"). 
 32. The jury only heard testimony regarding a lump-sum royalty award. Transcript of Record, 
Vol. XVIII, supra note 16, at 47–48. Consequently, the jury verdict form only provided a single line 
for the jury to award damages. See Jury Verdict Form at 5, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours 
and Co., No. 4:09-CV-00686-ERW (E.D. Mo. July 31, 2012).  
 33. See Transcript of Record, Vol. XVIII, supra note 16, at 145–48 (arguing that DuPont had 
a six year head start, accounting for $800 million to $1 billion dollars in value). 
 34. See Transcript of Record, Vol. XV-B, supra note 19, at 27–28. 
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willing to enter into such a license for Monsanto’s technology.
35
 Accord-
ingly, DuPont should have been able to prevent the jury from even con-
sidering such a large lump-sum award. This could have taken the form of 
a motion in limine precluding Monsanto’s witnesses from even propos-
ing such an award.
36
 Alternatively, DuPont could have asked for an in-
struction that required the jury to calculate damages based on the number 
of infringing seeds.  
So long as the evidence did not show that DuPont was willing to 
pay a one billion dollar lump sum, DuPont still had some room to ma-
neuver. Its attorneys elicited testimony from its damages experts discuss-
ing the risk of paying huge sums of money upfront.
37
 Relying on such 
testimony, DuPont could have asked for a jury instruction requiring sub-
stantial evidence that DuPont was willing to assume the risk of failure 
before allowing the jury to award a lump-sum. Alternatively, the jury 
could have also been told that the larger the verdict the more they should 
consider awarding a running royalty. Finally, DuPont could have simply 
asked the court to overturn the damages award because there was no evi-




Although this Essay suggests that the Monsanto case was decided 
wrongly, it cannot say so with certainty until the Court unseals the criti-
cal documents. But that is not the point.
39
 This Essay simply uses the 
Monsanto case to illustrate what can happen when the law is applied 
without question. Mistakes are made. The lesson all lawyers should take 
away is: When the application of the law leads to results that feel wrong, 
probe deeper. Often you will find that the law does not work with the 
facts of your case. You can then argue that the law needs to be changed 
or that it should not be applied to your facts. 
* * * 
  
 35. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, Vol. XV-A, supra note 16, at 100–01 (discussing a pro-
posal from Monsanto to license the technology to DuPont for $1.5 billion that DuPont ultimately 
rejected). 
 36. This may be the subject of DuPont's motion to exclude that was filed under seal on March 
6, 2012. Motion to File Under Seal, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours and Co., No. 4:09-
CV-00686-ERW (E.D. Mo. July 31, 2012) (No. 1119).  
 37. See Transcript of Record, Vol. XV-A, supra note 16, at 100–01 (paying "lump sum 
amounts for unproven technology" would not be considered). 
 38. This would be accomplished by a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) or a 
remittitur. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), 59(e). 
 39. To be clear, this Essay is not intended as a criticism of DuPont's attorneys or the court. 
Rather, because the one billion dollar verdict looks horribly wrong, this Essay simply seeks to use 
this case to teach critical analysis.  
